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Jurisdiction in International Application
of United States Antitrust Laws
Hiroshi Fukuda*
N TODAY'S WORLD COMMUNITY, the United States, with its
common law tradition, has an unusually strong system of
antitrust laws with thoroughgoing enforcement machinery.
Although the antitrust laws of this country form a complex of
executive, legislative and judicial actions, the central figure is
the Sherman Act of 1890.1 Section I of the Act declares it illegal
to contract, combine or conspire in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations. The
basis of this antitrust policy is to prevent the tendency of mo-
nopolistic activities to missallocate resources, raise prices, and
reduce innovation, productivity, employment and consumption.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, and the greatest material progress,
while at the same time providing an environment conducive
to the preservation of our democratic, political and social
institutions. 2
With respect to international trade agreements, American
policy has constantly been opposed to restrictive business
practices. As early as 1910 in United States v. American To-
bacco Co.,3 the Supreme Court struck down an agreement be-
tween the defendant and an English corporation whereby they
agreed to end a trade war in which they were engaged by
limiting their business to their respective territories and sur-
rounding areas.
The attempts by the Government authorities to break down
those international restrictive agreements and combines were
greatly intensified after the Second World War. The main reasons
for this offensive were international conspiracies in various vital
* LL.B., Univ. of Tokyo, LL.M., Yale Univ., Attache, Embassy of Japan,
Washington, D. C. [This article expresses the personal opinion of the
author and not that of the Embassy of Japan.]
1 Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209; U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7, 15. For dis-
cussion of U. S. Anti-Trust Laws, see, 4 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law,
c. 74 (1960).
2 Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. U. S., 356 U. S. 1, 4 (1958).
s 221 U. S. 106 (1910).
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industries which endangered the security of this country at that
time. The Report from The Subcommittee on War Mobilization
of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate
stated in 1944 that:
Standing athwart the achievement of international goals of
world prosperity and enduring peace is the international
cartel system. . . . The extensive testimony . . . has estab-
lished beyond question that the international cartel or
monopoly system has been subversive of political security,
full production and employment and the expansion of world
trade. These effects have not been incidental . . . but have
arisen out of their essential character. Private restrictive
economic agreements and monopolistic profits inevitably
minimize political security, jobs and world trade.4
This zeal has appeared, since then, as a movement for more
extensive application of the antitrust laws of the United States.
This trend was prompted by the fact that the economy of this
country was more and more closely related to that of other
countries and consequently many industries have been involved
in international business.
However, this trend has given rise to another important
question, namely the jurisdictional problem of antitrust laws.
Many people, both in this country and abroad, criticized this
trend as an abuse of power and invasion of foreign sovereignty.
The objective of this paper is, therefore, to analyze the under-
lying theories of jurisdiction with respect to antitrust laws and
to discover the existing jurisdictional limitations imposed by the
courts on themselves.
Theories of Jurisdiction and Courts' Practice
An analysis of codes and practices of modern nations is said
to reveal five general principles by which more or less extensive
jurisdiction is claimed at the present time. These five principles 5
are:
(1) The Territoriality Principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the place where the offence is committed
(regarded by nearly every nation as of primary importance);
(2) The Nationality Principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the nationality or national character of the
4 Report from the Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the Committee on
Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, "Cartels and National Security" pt. I, "Find-
ings and Recommendations," (Nov. 13, 1944) p. 10.
5 Briggs, Law of Nations, (2d ed., 1952) at 575-577.
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person committing the offence (universally accepted, though
variously applied);
(3) The Protective Principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the national interest injured by the offence
(claimed by most states but not often followed in the United
States);
(4) The Universality Principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the custody of the person (widely but not
universally accepted); and
(5) The Passive Personality Principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national
character of the person injured by the act (not very widely
accepted).
Of these five principles the most important for regulation
of restraint of trade are the nationality principle and territori-
ality principle.
The Nationality Principle
In the world community of nation-states, it has been seldom
questioned that nation-states have general jurisdiction over their
own nationals. Professor Hyde states:
It is generally agreed that a State may punish its own
nationals for disobeying its commands while in a foreign
country, notwithstanding the legal quality which the terri-
torial sovereign may have annexed to the acts of disobedi-
ence... 6
This principle is generally recognized on the theory of a
continuing allegiance of the national to his nation-state regardless
of his travel across national boundaries. This principle has been
well recognized by American courts in many cases. For instance,
in Blackmer v. U. S.7 the Supreme Court declared that an
American residing abroad could be subpoenaed for testimony in
this country, and in his failure to appear the United States could
fine him and collect the amount from his property in the United
States.
This jurisdiction will not be weakened even if an American
corporation has an agreement with a foreign corporation, and
this was made clear in the National Lead case.' Judge Rifkind
in the District Court stated:
6 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States (2d. Rev. ed. 1945) I, 802-803.
7 284 U. S. 421 (1932).
8 U. S. v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
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The argument has been advanced that this court cannot
invalidate contracts with parties who are not within the
court's jurisdiction and amenable to its order. The absence
of National Lead's foreign associates will, of course, place
a practical limitation upon the scope of the court's decree:
it does not prevent the court from finding a violation as
the facts warrant and from restraining those within the
reach of its mandate from continuing a conspiracy in de-
fiance of the Sherman Act.9
In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U. S., 10 where American
Timken owned 30% of British Timken and 50% of French Tim-
ken, and, with the interest held by a third party, controlled both,
the Supreme Court held that ". . . the fact that there is common
ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not
liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws." "
Thus, it seems rather clear by now that all American corpo-
rations will fall under the jurisdiction of American courts for
violations of the antitrust laws even though the acts are done in
a foreign country.
However, the nationality principle is clearly not enough to
cover the whole area of restrictive business practice. A company
may easily incorporate itself in a foreign country and have a
home office there, and yet can effectively restrain the trade of
this country through various activities. In fact, the idea of
"nationality" or "citizenship" is not adequate for the overall con-
trol of corporations. Thus, another principle of jurisdiction,
i.e. the territoriality principle, has attracted the attention of
many experts and scholars interested in the control of restrictive
business practice, and has been applied concurrently by courts
in some cases.
Territoriality Principle
This principle, in its strict sense, is based on the complete
sovereignty or competence of the nation-state over all acts taking
place within its territory whether the party is foreign or national,
and this has been fairly well accepted by various nations, in-
cluding the United States, although there are striking differences
in the extent to which it is used in the different national systems.
9 U. S. v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); AfE. 332
U. S. 319 (1947).
10 341 U. S. 593 (1951).
11 id. at 598.
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In the sphere of antitrust law jurisdiction, there has been
no doubt as to the jurisdiction of American courts over foreign
corporations doing business in the United States. Professor
Neale states:
Such companies must obviously conform to the law of the
sovereign who gives hospitality to their commerce. A
foreign company which imports and distributes large quanti-
ties of goods in the United States is no more entitled than
an American company to make price-fixing agreements in
the American markets.
12
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,'3 a treble
damage action in which the plaintiff complained of the rough
methods used by the defendant to maintain its dominant position
in the ownership and control of fruit plantations in Panama, the
defendant was an American company, but since the acts com-
plained of took place in Central America, the Supreme Court
held that no cause of action had been stated and Mr. Justice
Holmes dealt with the jurisdictional point as follows:
. . . The general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be deter-
mined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done. . . . For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own
notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts,
not only would be unjust, but would be an interference,
which the other state concerned justly might resent ...
The foregoing consideration would lead in case of doubt
to a construction of any statute as confined in its operations
and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker
has general and legitimate power .... All litigation is prima
facie territorial.. 14
Three cases decided after the Banana case,' 5 namely U. S.
v. Pacific & Artic Ry. & Nay. Co.,16 Thomsen v. Cayser,"' and
U. S. v. Sisal Sales Corp.'s are said to be reconciled with concepts
of strict territoriality because acts constituting violations oc-
12 Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U. S. A. (1960) 321-322.
13 213 U. S. 347 (1909).
14 id. at 357.
15 Supra n. 13.
16 228 U. S. 87 (1913).
17 243 U. S. 66 (1917).
18 274 U. S. 268 (1927).
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curred within American territory, although these cases did in-
volve extraterritorial activities necessary to the success of the
defendants' ventures.
However, the strict territorial view, based in part on the
theory that a single act has significance primarily where per-
formed, became inadequate for the analysis of later cases in-
volving facts so complex that an individual act had meaning only
in relation to an entire international agreement. For instance,
United States courts will be effectively enjoined from enforcing
their antitrust laws in such cases as conspiracies between foreign
companies not to supply the United States. Also, it is rather
difficult, under this theory, to exploit for enforcement purposes
evidence obtainable from foreign companies. Similarly, effective
enforcement without the power to regulate activities abroad
becomes almost impossible. Consequently, there has always
been pressure on courts from the enforcement agencies to take
up a wider interpretation with respect to the scope of antitrust
law jurisdiction, and some recent courts decisions followed these
suggestions. The new principle is known as the Impact Terri-
toriality Principle, which would extend courts' competence to
acts taking place abroad but which have effect (or impact)
within the territory. This was explicitly stated by the American
court for the first time in 1945 by the famous Alcoa case. 19 There
Judge Learned Hand held that certain restrictive agreements
between foreign companies violated Section I of the Sherman
Act, though they were made outside the United States and no
American company was shown to be a party to them. In this
case, there was no express reference in the agreements to im-
ports into the United States, but Judge Hand felt able to say
that "they were intended to affect imports and did affect them."
He based his condemnation of the agreements on the propo-
sition that "Any state may impose liabilities even upon persons
not within its allegiance for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within the borders which the State reprehends." 20
The seemingly conflicting opinions of the Banana case 2' and
the Alcoa case, 22 were reconciled on the ground that the "effect"
19 U. S. v. Alcoa, 148 F. 2d. 416 (2d Cir. 1946).
20 id. at 443.
21 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. Supra n. 13.
22 U. S. v. Alcoa, supra n. 19.
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took place in the United States. Consequently the Alcoa case is
not inconsistent with the territorial principle of the Banana case.
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 23 a trade-mark case, the
Supreme Court held that
... Viewed in its context, the holding in that case (Banana)
was not meant to confer blanket immunity on trade prac-
tices which radiate unlawful consequences here, merely
because they were initiated or consummated outside the
territorial limits of the United States. Unlawful effects in
this country, absent in the posture of the Banana case be-
fore us, are often decisive . . .24 (Emphasis added.)
The effect test, however, is a "potentially limitless charter
of jurisdiction" 25 for in the present interdependent world com-
munity any commercial transactions will be said to have some
effect on the United States economy. Mr. Haight states:
If a State can take jurisdiction over acts committed abroad
by foreigners because they have 'consequences' within its
territory and it 'reprehends' such acts, the door is open to
an almost unlimited extension of extraterritorial juris-
diction.26
If widely applied, this principle may lead to the prosecution
of foreign nationals who lack the knowledge of U. S. antitrust
laws some day in the future when they happen to come to this
country or obtain property here. Also, the frustration of foreign
countries' policies as to the regulation of restrictive business
practices, which are usually quite different from those of the
United States might lead to diplomatic difficulties between this
country and others.
Therefore, various factors have been introduced to limit the
wide interpretation of territoriality principle with respect to
antitrust jurisdiction of United States courts, and some of them
are now observed by the enforcement agencies and courts. The
next section will be devoted then to the exploration of these
several limitations on the impact territoriality principle of juris-
diction.
23 344 U. S. 280 (1952).
24 Id. at 288.
25 Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws; A Conflict of
Laws Approach, 70 Yale L. J. 259, 261. (1960)
26 Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-
trust Laws, 63 Yale L. J. 639, 643. (1955).
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Impact of Territoriality Principle and Its Limitations
Arguments that Extraterritorial Application of U. S. Antitrust
Laws Are Against International Law Because They Are
Penal
United States antitrust laws (Sherman Act, Clayton Act,
Federal Trade Commission Act, etc.) prescribe both so-called
criminal and civil sanctions. The former may result in a fine or
imprisonment; the latter may comprise treble damages and in-
junctive relief compelling the disposition of property or per-
haps reconstruction of an industry, etc. While criminal pro-
ceedings carry the stigma of indictment, finger-printing and con-
viction, civil proceedings may result in forbidding a company
to do many things. Orders may be issued requiring the com-
pany to divest itself of valuable property which it holds abroad,
to alter contracts, to license patents, and to grant patent im-
munities. 27
These rather severe sanctions in civil proceedings in anti-
trust laws has led to the criticism by many scholars and busi-
nessmen that the distinctions which prevail in the United States
between criminal and civil proceedings under the Sherman Act
are not relevant in determining whether the proceedings are
penal in the international sense. They argue, then, that, as it is
an established principle of international law that penal laws
should not be applied extraterritorially, "extraterritorial appli-
cation of American antitrust laws conflicts with public interna-
tional law." 28
Some of the proponents of this argument concede that
It is true that there are certain contexts in which a State is
regarded as competent to punish a foreigner for acts com-
mitted abroad which are directly connected with a crime
within its territory (e.g., shooting a person across the
border) . . . but economic crimes cannot be regarded as the
same. .... 29
The leading case in international law where such an "objective"
application of extraterritorial penal law has been involved is the
famous Lotus"° case of 1927. There the Permanent Court of In-
27 Id. at 640.
28 Id. at 641.
29 Neale, op. cit. supra n. 26, at 324.
3o The Lotus Case, Permanent Court of International Justice P. C. I. J.,
Series A, No. 10 (1927).
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ternational Justice decided a case involving a collision, outside
territorial waters, between a French and a Turkish vessel,
causing the loss of the latter and the death of eight Turkish
nationals, in favor of Turkey on the ground that the crime had
been committed in Turkish territory (i.e., the Turkish vessel)
notwithstanding the fact that the French officer had at all times
remained on board the French vessel. The case is authority for
the proposition that a State has competence to punish a foreigner
for his acts abroad if such acts form a constituent element of a
crime consummated within the territory of the State.
However, they argue that "an objective application" of the
territoriality principle in penal law is only permissible when
"not only is the consummation or 'effect' inseparable from the
act committed abroad but the offense is one which the community
of civilized nations has come to regard as justifying a modifica-
tion of the strict territorial principle. . . ." S1
Features which distinguish antitrust violations from those
regarded as crimes by the community of civilized nations are
said to be as follows:
i) Violation of United States antitrust laws (especial-
ly Section I, II of the Sherman Act) do not fall within any
category of crimes which are common to such community.
ii) While in usual crimes the proximity of cause and
effect is direct and readily ascertainable, the Sherman Act
offense is complex, and it is usually difficult to establish the
relationship of cause and effect.
iii) The prohibitions of antitrust acts are vague and
uncertain in nature.
iv) If international law were to permit the extensive
application of antitrust laws, it would open the door to inter-
ference with freedoms and liberties guaranteed by other na-
tions.
Thus, it may be concluded that foreign nationals are answer-
able for their criminal conduct only within the territory of the
United States. Even if prosecution for what is done abroad can
be justified in some criminal cases, the consequences and harm-
ful effects of international restrictive business practice is too
vague to be a "constituent element of a crime," which might
permit an objective application of penal laws.
On the other hand, it is suggested that antitrust laws are
31 Haight op. cit. supra n. 26 at 644; Neale op. cit. supra n. 12 at 324.
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entirely applicable extraterritorially because they are of regula-
tory nature and cannot be categorized as either penal or civil.
One of the arguments runs as follows:
Such a distinction (between penal and remedial legislation
depending upon whether the statute in question punished
an offense against public justice or provided a remedy for
injury to private interests) may have been meaningful in
terms of the laissez-faire philosophy of an age which could
still clearly distinguish a limited area of public activity
from the private sector. But with the continued growth of
an industrial society came an expansion of regulatory legis-
lation and an increasing number of new types of statutes ...
Such statutes represent declarations of the public interest in
private transactions. . . . The antitrust laws are typical.
the majority of antitrust proceedings are civil in nature.
The impossibility of categorizing regulatory legislation
as either penal or remedial renders the penal-remedial dis-
tinction useless as a standard for determining whether or
not a given regulatory law should be applied extraterri-
torially.3
2
Although it is true that "the increasingly industrialized economy
to which regulatory legislation is a response, leads to a large
number of transactions affecting interests located in more than
one jurisdiction, and consequently it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to define rigid rules which will unerringly identify the one
proper law applicable to transaction. . . .,, 33, the writer does not
believe in giving up the distinction between penal and civil laws.
It is absolutely clear that, even in today's developed world com-
munity, nation-states have exclusive authority and competence
over their respective territories and prohibition against extra-
territorial application of penal laws, based upon an identifica-
tion of jurisdiction with sovereignty, cannot be easily discarded
as outdated. The principle still serves both independence and
friendly relations of nation-states.3
4
At the same time, however, categorization of all U. S. anti-
trust laws as penal cannot be adequate. This theory lacks recog-
nition of today's complicated economic systems which require
some degree of government regulation.
82 Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws. Notes and
Comments, 70 Yale L. J. 259, 267 (1960).
33 Id. at 268.
84 Id. at 269.
Jan., 1963
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss1/13
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
The proper conclusion will be therefore, that some distinc-
tion between penal and civil proceedings in the field of antitrust
laws is still very useful, and generally only civil proceedings
should be used against restrictive business practice by foreign
nationals abroad. In other words, the impact territoriality prin-
ciple should not be applied for criminal proceedings except in a
case where "effect" is clearly a "constituent part" of a crime.
In the Oil Cartel case of 1952, 35 a suit in criminal proceeding
was brought against five American oil companies along with
Royal-Dutch Shell, Anglo-Iranian, and a French company for
violation of the Sherman Act in the production and marketing of
Arabian oil. (Anglo-Iranian had previously been given sovereign
immunity from subpoenas.) The Dutch, French and other con-
cerned governments protested against the suit on the ground that
it is violating sovereign rights of foreign nations. Aiding their
argument was the announcement by the Department of Defense
to the effect that the suit was a threat to our military security.
The Truman administration, then, dismissed the action. Al-
though the case was opened again in 1953, it was a civil action
and against the five American defendants only.3 6
Thus, by permitting only civil proceedings against foreign
restrictive business practice, the United States is able to not only
enforce its regulatory legislation effectively, but also preserve
friendly relations with foreign countries by avoiding or at least
decreasing the possibility of "sovereignty" questions.
Sovereign Immunity-the Act of State Doctrine
An act of state is an act done by the sovereign power of a
country, or by its delegate, within the limits of authority vested
in him. An act of state cannot be questioned or made the sub-
ject of legal proceedings in a court of law. While it is said some-
times that these acts are based upon international comity or
courtesy, and while they doubtlessly find their origin therein,
they may now be said to be based upon generally accepted usage,
i.e., international law.37 This has been accepted in American
35 The Oil Cartel case, In re Investigation of World Arrangement with
Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of
Petroleum, 13 F. R. D. 280 (D. D. C. 1952).
M U. S. v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, et al., No. 1779-53 (S. D. N. Y. 1953).
37 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940-1944) 2:393.
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courts for a long time. As early as 1812, Chief Justice Marshall
said in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon38 that:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of con-
ferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contem-
plate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its ob-
jects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another,
and being bound by obligations of the highest character not
to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its
sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging
to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended
to him.3 9
Therefore, it is natural that the United States will not apply its
antitrust laws for foreign restrictive business practice if it find
them acts of foreign states.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,40 although it
was declared that the acts complained of took place in a foreign
country and consequently the plaintiff did not have any cause
of action, it should be noted that the acts complained of were of-
ficial acts of the sovereign Government of Costa Rica and would
have been immune from the United States jurisdiction anyway
even if they were allegedly influenced by the defendant.
Those who favor strict limitation on extraterritorial applica-
tion of the United States antitrust laws argue for more liberal
use of this doctrine, i.e., courts should dismiss suits whenever
they could find foreign government involvement in the restrictive
business practice.
In U. S. v. Sisal Sales Corp.,41 the court did not go so far
as to proclaim that a monopoly based upon discriminatory legis-
lation enacted by a foreign government could be regarded as ex-
empt from United States jurisdiction. Also, a defense based upon
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was rejected in U. S. v.
Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,42 although the French Gov-
ernment owned a majority of the defendant corporation's shares.
38 U. S. Sup. Ct., 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
39 Id. at 136.
40 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. supra n. 13.
41 Supra n. 18.
42 31 F. 2d 199 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
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Some critics suggest that these two decisions indicate that the
United States has not been observing the act of state doctrine in
anti-trust cases and thus has been violating international law.43
However, in the Sisal case,44 the court can be said to have
made a right decision, considering the fact that every govern-
ment in the present world community is more or less involved
in some kind of regulatory legislation of their national economies,
and that it is to invalidate antitrust laws of this country to in-
terpret that foreign legislation would render a monopoly an act
of state and immune from United States courts' jurisdiction.
Also, in relation to the case of Kalisyndikat,45 it will be interest-
ing to note that, in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case,46 the Inter-
national Court of Justice held that a mere majority holding of a
company shares by a government will not make the company
activities acts of state. In that case, the court declared that
majority stock holding by the British Government of the A. I. 0.
C. did not make the concession agreement between the company
and the Government of Iran a treaty.
As a matter of fact, United States courts have been taking
into consideration the act of state doctrine in a proper manner.
One example is the Oil Cartel case of 1952.
4 7
In that case American and British controlled oil companies
were summoned before a Grand Jury on charges of the alleged
domination of world oil production and prices through an in-
ternational cartel system. The counsel representing the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company contended that many of the documents
subpoenaed by the Department of Justice were not in its pos-
session and, indeed, not in the United States at all. He read to
the court a letter sent to his company by the British Minister
of Fuel and Power which stated that such a subpoena was "con-
trary to international comity" and that the disclosure of some
of its documents concerned might well "prejudice or endanger
the economic, strategic or political interests of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment and required the company not to produce any docu-
ments which were not in the United States and which did not
43 Supra n. 25 at 267.
44 U. S. v. Sisal Sales Corp. Supra n. 18.
45 U. S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft supra n. 42.
46 United Kingdom v. Iran, Judgment of July 22, 1952 (1952) I. C. J. Rep.
93, 112, A. J. I. L. 737, 748 (1952).
47 Supra n. 35.
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relate to business in the United States without approval of the
British government. Judge Kirkland thereupon ruled that the
A. 1. 0. C. was "indistinguishable from the Government of
Great Britain," and for that reason it could rightly claim "sov-
ereign immunity." He stated:
The consequences of a successful prosecution of the A. I. 0.
C. here, would, in reality, be to charge and find the British
Government guilty of violating a law of the United States,
which imposes criminal penalties.18
Accordingly, he quashed the subpoena on the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company. However, it should be noted that the court did not
find the A. I. 0. C. immune on the ground that the British Gov-
ernment owned a majority of its stock, but rather on the ground
that the activities of the company were indistinguishable from
those of the Government because too much national security was
involved in the activities (keeping British maritime fleet supplied
with oil).
Since 1952, the Department of Justice adopted the govern-
mental-commercial distinction as the basis of a policy limiting
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.49
Although this distinction is very vague and its validity is
rather doubtful in borderline cases,5" it will be helpful to apply
the act of state doctrine in particular cases to avoid any un-
necessary friction between foreign countries and the United
States. Also, it should be remembered that this doctrine will
apply not only to the extraterritorial acts but also acts performed
by foreign governments in this country, and consequently it is
not confined to the limitations of the impact territoriality princi-
ple.
Diplomatic Considerations-Comity
Even though it is found that the Sherman Act is applicable,
that the foreign corporation is subject to it, and that personal
jurisdiction is obtainable over the foreign company, the diffi-
cult problem of comity with friendly nations remains.
Advocates of a strict territorial concept of international law
contend that the antitrust laws of the United States should be
48 Supra n. 35 at 291.
49 Letter from the State Department to the Attorney General, May 19, 1952,
26 Department of State Bulletin 984 (1952).
50 Supra n. 25 at 272.
Jan., 1963
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss1/13
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
construed as applicable only to those violations occurring with-
in the United States, because, if extended, strained international
relations might result. They also contend that in these cases,
enforceability of those judgments would be highly doubtful and
courts should avoid giving ineffectual verdicts.
It is admittedly true that the United States has much stricter
policies as to restrictive business practices than do any other
countries. In some countries, cartels are even encouraged. Ac-
cordingly, the view above stated apparently looks upon the im-
portance of avoiding the contingency of strained relations be-
tween nations as outweighing the value of flexible judicial con-
trol of supernational cartels.
The impact of the conflict of antitrust policies between the
United States and other countries was fully felt in the case of
U. S. v. Imperial Chemical Industry Ltd.51 The decree in that
case required I. C. I., a British Corporation, to divest itself of
certain patents which it had obtained from DuPont, an Ameri-
can concern. I. C. I., however, together with another British com-
pany had already created a company called British Nylon Spin-
ners, Ltd., to which it had granted an exclusive license under
the patent in question.52 After the I. C. I. case in the United
States, British Nylon Spinners applied to the British courts for
an injunction restraining I. C. I. from complying with the United
States decree and ordering it to execute the license. The decree
was granted.53 Although Judge Ryan, in the I. C. I. case, ob-
served that the patent licensing in question was a conspiracy to
divide territories which affected American commerce and thus
violated the Sherman Act,54 the Court of Appeals in England
rejected the order because it constituted an attempt to "assert
an extraterritorial jurisdiction which the court of this country
cannot recognize. .. ." 55
Referring to the statement in Judge Ryan's opinion that "it
is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign sovereign for
this court to direct that steps be taken to remove the harmful
effects on the trade of the United States," the Master of Rolls
said:
51 105 F. Supp. 215, 229-31 (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
52 Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws. Supra n. 25 at 276.
53 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (1953)
1 Ch. 19 (C. A.), made permanent, (1955) 1 Ch. 37.
54 U. S. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. Supra n. 51 at 504, 592.
55 British Nylon Spinners v. I. C. I. Supra n. 53 at 24.
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
If by that passage the learned Judge intended to say (as it
seems to me that he did) that it was not an intrusion on the
authority of a foreign sovereign to make directions addressed
to that foreign sovereign or to its courts or to nationals of
that foreign power effective to remove (as he did) "harm-
ful effects on the trade of the United States," I am bound
to say that, as at present advised, I find myself unable to
agree with it.
s6
In the Oil Cartel case,5 7 the Shipping Industry case, 58 and some
other cases, various foreign governments protested vigorously to
the production of documents located overseas and yet subpoe-
naed. In the extreme case, a foreign local government made it
a crime to ship out any documents existing in that country to a
foreign government for investigation. 59 Thus, it is clear that
some kind of considerations are necessary to be given for the ap-
plication of antitrust laws in order to avoid resultant friction be-
tween nations.
Some critics use the public policy doctrine to meet this
need.60 Public policy has been used in private international law
to justify application of a domestic rule of law in cases where
the forum's choice-of-law would otherwise have dictated the ap-
plication of foreign law. They now wish to interpret the public
policy doctrine to include "the consideration of foreign interests,"
so that this would serve as a new doctrine of comity replacing
the territoriality principle.6'
However, even though it is clear that some political consid-
erations are necessary, the newly interpreted public policy doc-
trine is not a theory of jurisdiction, as is the territoriality princi-
ple. The new theory of public policy doctrine may be used in
the interpretation of the substance of antitrust law, or as a basis
for purely political consideration by courts and enforcement of-
ficers, but cannot replace the territoriality principle.6 2
56 Ibid.
57 In re Investigation of World Arrangement with relation to the Pro-
duction, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum. Supra
n. 35.
58 In the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industries,
1960 Trade Case No. 69746 (D. D. C. 1960).
59 Business Records Protection Act, 1 Ontario Rev. Stat. ch. 44 (1950),
Canada.
60 Supra n. 25 at 277.
61 Ibid.
62 See, Cheatham, Conflict of Laws, (4th ed., 1957), p. 105 note.
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This does not mean that any consideration of political cir-
cumstances by the courts and the enforcement agencies is un-
necessary for the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
On the contrary, it is of absolute necessity and is rather well
recognized in practice.
For instance, in these days as a practical matter, the Depart-
ment of State and the Department of Justice which is the main
enforcement agency of the antitrust laws, work closely together
to develop solutions in antitrust cases which have foreign policy
implications. Recent examples include the Swiss Watch case,0 3 the
Oil Cartel case,64 and the Shipping Industries caseY3 The Straus
Report of 1959 states:
The Department of Justice in recent years has not taken any
action involving foreign relations without prior consultation
with the Department of State. .. .6
Regular consultation by the Department of Justice with
other agencies, including the State Department, before com-
mencing a broad investigation or bringing any antitrust proceed-
ing in international field, would undoubtedly result in a more ac-
curate assessment of possible damage to America's international
position.67
Also, the courts from time to time have used savings clauses
in their holdings to avoid any impasse. For instance, in U. S.
v. General Electric Co.,6s the court included the following para-
graph in its final order:
Philips (the foreign corporate defendant) shall not be in
contempt of this Judgment for doing anything outside the
United States which is required or for not doing anything
outside of the United States which is unlawful under the
laws of the government . . . in which Philips or any other
subsidiaries may be incorporated . . . or . . . may be doing
business.69
63 Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 61 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st
sess., pt. 4, at 1846, 1848.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Straus, Expanding Private Investment for Free World Economic Growth,
Department of State 30 (1959).
67 Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad, note 49 at 418-440,
444-445 (1958).
68 115 F. Supp. 835 (D. N. J. 1953).
69 Id. at 878.
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In any country, trade regulation or lack of it is determined
by the judgment of that country as to what is best in its own
public interest. So long as nations are independent, each one
must determine for itself what is in the interest of its own pub-
lic. Therefore, a skillful drafting of a decree, and use of savings
clauses may not only avert a political conflict of obligations but
may also ensure that foreign laws will not thwart the purpose
of the court's order. However, this consideration should be
clearly separated from the question of the jurisdiction of courts,
for the misunderstanding may lead to thwarting the purposes of
the U. S. antitrust laws by limiting courts' jurisdiction to an
extreme extent.
Jurisdictional Difficulties Confronting the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of U. S. Antitrust Laws
This brief study of the jurisdiction of courts with respect
to the application of the U. S. antitrust laws suggests many
difficulties which will confront the United States courts in the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. In addition to the
limitations on jurisdiction and deliberate discretion by courts
and the Department of Justice, extraterritorial application of
the United States antitrust laws will still have to face the follow-
ing difficulties.
The Question of Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants
The Scophony70 and U. S. Alkali7 ' cases have given liberal
interpretations to the venue and personal service provisions of
the Sherman Act so that any corporation which is transacting
business of a substantial character within a federal judicial dis-
trict may now be sued under the Act. Nevertheless, many cor-
porations which restrain American foreign commerce do not
satisfy this test, and consequently cannot be reached under the
Sherman Act. When the courts decide that they have no juris-
diction because of the lack of personal service over foreign anti-
trust defendants, the Government must dismiss its complaint. The
DeBeers case72 of 1948, a suit against several South African
70 U. S. v. Scophony, 333 U. S. 795 (1947).
71 U. S. v. U. S. Alkali Export Association, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S. D. N. Y.
1949).
72 DeBeers Consol. Mines v. U. S., 325 U. S. 212 (1948).
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diamond mining companies, illustrates one such frustrating
situation. Even where the Department of Justice succeeds in
establishing jurisdiction by personally serving the parties, as it
did in the Alcoa case, 73 this frequently takes place only after
expensive and delaying jurisdictional objections by defendants.
The difficulty of obtaining personal service explains why so
many international cartel cases involve foreign co-conspirators
who are not joined as co-defendants. For example, in the General
Electric case,74 all of the G. E.'s German, English and other
foreign cartel associates, except a Dutch firm which happened to
have had a factory in the United States, were immune from the
suit. The present situation that a selective enforcement of the
American antitrust laws have been made against foreign busi-
nesses that "happen to get caught within the jurisdiction" pleases
neither defendants nor enforcement authorities.
Difficulty in Obtaining Evidence
It is difficult and often impossible to obtain, by the use of
American judicial process, business records located overseas
which are of vital importance for investigation and proceedings.
National sentiments are sometimes mixed with this process, and
this makes things more difficult. It is well known that sometimes
foreign governments prohibit the production of any record for
investigation by foreign governments. 75 More often, the regis-
tration of governmental protests in many cases also hamper the
obtainment of documents.
7 6
Also, the lack of comprehensiveness of business records and
statistics in foreign countries, transportation costs and other
factors will impede the securing of relevant information.
Involvement of a Foreign Government
Another impediment to antitrust enforcement is the extent
to which foreign governments may be involved in a cartel situa-
tion.
73 Supra n. 19.
74 U. S. v. General Electric Co., supra n. 68.
75 E.g., In re Canadian International Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 100 (S. D. N. Y.
1947), Business Records Protection Act of Ontario. Supra n. 59.
76 E.g., the Oil Cartel case, In re Investigation of World Arrangement with
Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of
Petroleum. Supra n. 35.
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Although it is now clear that when cartels are in the nature
of acts of state, the antitrust laws of the United States cannot
be applied to regulate them, difficult questions may arise when
foreign governments unofficially exert pressures which tend to
restrain U. S. foreign commerce.
Unavailability of Extraterritorial Remedies
Assuming an airtight antitrust case, in which all the parties
involved are properly served as defendants, production of docu-
ments being made, there would still remain a final obstacle to
success in enforcement, i.e., securing of satisfactory relief. Failure
to achieve adequate relief makes any antitrust proceedings, how-
ever conclusive it may be, a waste of time and money.
On top of the courts' reluctance in some cases to issue in-
junctions against foreign corporations abroad, the problem re-
mains that court orders having extraterritorial effect can only be
effectively enforced abroad through foreign courts. These courts
are not obliged to give effect to a U. S. court judgment but do so
only through comity or respect for the laws of a foreign nation.
As the Nylon Spinners case7 7 indicates, foreign courts may not
be willing to give effect to an American antitrust judgment,
because usually it reflects a public policy different from that of
their own countries and involves rather unfamiliar judicial
remedies.
Such unwillingness will be particularly evident where
foreign vested interests may be impaired by the enforcements
of the American judgments. Accordingly, in international cases
the antitrust judge is deprived of the wide range of alternatives
which enables him to give reasonably adequate relief in domestic
cases.
Because control of restrictive business practice can be made
effective only through rather extensive application of antitrusts
laws and considering the jurisdictional problem, it is concluded
that cartels and international trade restraints are an international
problem and must be dealt with on that basis. Solutions must
be sought through some kind of international organizations,
treaties and so forth. Despite numerous attempts,78 international
cooperation has not yet been successful in this field. However,
77 Supra n. 53.
78 E.g., See U. N. Doc. No. E/2612 (1951). E/2380, E/AC, 37/3 (1953).
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this does not mean that the final solution of effective antitrust
enforcement will be made without any international cooperation,
and until some solutions are reached on that level, the United
States must rely, for the time being, on the treaty making power
in order to mitigate the effect of international monopoly.79
79 Presently, the Restrictive Business Practice Clause was incorporated
in eight of the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between
the United States and foreign countries. See, Haight, The Restrictive
Business Practice Clause in United States Treaties, 70 Yale L. J. 240, 242-
243 (1960).
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